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Evolutionary models of mutualism*
Erol Akçay
Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania
Mutualisms are among the most important ecological interactions, yet disciplinary folklore
holds that they were long neglected in favor of competition and prey-predator interactions. Fortu-
nately, this situation changed dramatically in the last three decades and the evolutionary theory of
mutualisms has been attracting increasing interest. As a result, we now have a large enough collec-
tion of evolutionary models of mutualisms to warrant its own survey. Most of the present chapter
focuses on the question that has been the dominant one in mutualism theory: how cooperation
between species can evolve and be maintained through natural selection.
In many mutualisms, helping an individual of the partner species (e.g., providing protection,
housing or nutrients) is costly, i.e., all else being equal, it decreases the ﬁtness of the individual
providing it. Such costly helping behaviors (or phenotypes) are termed investments. Mutualisms
based on investments are liable to be taken over by what are generally called cheaters (see Chapter
7): individuals that enjoy the beneﬁt from the mutualism, but do not provide any beneﬁts in return.
An example would be a plant-ant that feeds on the extra-ﬂoral nectaries of its host tree, but does
not provide any protection in return (see Box 7.1 and Chapter 10). In the absence of a means
to control cheating, trees hosting such ants would get selected to reduce the amount of extra-ﬂoral
nectar they produce, until cooperation disappears (or remains at vestigial levels). Many evolutionary
models of mutualisms are concerned with how mutualisms can persist in the face of cheaters, or
equivalently, howmutualistic interactions resolve the inherent conﬂicts of interests between species.
Accordingly, most of this chapter will deal with the modeling approaches used in this eﬀort.
The twin goals of this chapter are to provide an overview of the rich theory of mutualism evolu-
tion as well as an introduction to the mathematical methods used in it. These methods are diverse,
from adaptive dynamics to quantitative genetics, and a whole host of diverse approaches inspired by
economics. Many of the modeling approaches in mutualism theory parallel those that deal with co-
operation within species, which is hardly surprising given the conceptual closeness of the questions
and the fact that many theorists contribute to both literatures. Yet, there are also some diﬀerences
in emphasis. Although selection in structured populations (i.e., kin- or multi-level selection) is the
dominant explanation for within-species cooperation, its action in mutualisms is much less studied
(see section 4.2). Conversely, mutualism theory puts a lot more emphasis on ﬂexible investment
phenotypes (e.g., sanctions, partner choice; see section 4.4) than within-species theory. On bal-
ance, there is scope for much better integration of within- and between-species cooperation theories
and modeling approaches.
*This is the draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming
book Mutualism, edited by Judith Bronstein, due for publication in 2015.
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I organized the chapter around the biological concepts, discussing the relevant modeling meth-
ods in due order. The ﬁrst four sections, making up the bulk of the chapter are devoted to the
diﬀerent biological mechanisms that can resolve the cheater problem. Section 4.5 discusses the
evolution of diversity and section 4.6 some of the exciting future directions for mutualism theory.
4.1 Vertical transmission of symbioses
In somemutualisms, such as those between the leaf-cutter ants and their fungal symbionts, the hosts
acquire their symbionts (see Box 6.1) from their parents. Such “vertical” transmission of symbionts
(as opposed to horizontal, or environmentally acquired) is expected to favormutualisms (Fine, 1975;
Ewald, 1987): helping the host produce more progeny will also produce more symbiont progeny if
symbionts are transferred to the oﬀspring. Vertical transmission may have lead to the evolution of
two of themost important symbioses in the history of life: chloroplasts andmitochondria. On a less
grand scale, maternally transmittedWolbachia spreading through populations ofDrosophila simulans
in California has rapidly evolved from imposing a fecundity cost to infected females to conferring
a fecundity beneﬁt (Weeks et al., 2007). Thus, perfect (or high-ﬁdelity) vertical transmission can
in theory and in the real world resolve the conﬂict of interest between the host and symbiont and
make the cheater problem disappear. But how do separate organisms evolve vertical transmission
in the ﬁrst place?
This question has been studied using the theory of virulence evolution in disease causing organ-
isms. Virulence is deﬁned as an index of the harm a symbiont causes to the host, so a mutualist is
simply a symbiont with negative virulence. Many virulence evolution models have to deal with the
coupled ecological and evolutionary dynamics of host and symbiont populations. Generally, this
is an intractable task, but in the last two decades, a framework called adaptive dynamics (AD) was
developed that can yield analytical insight under some simplifying assumptions (Dieckmann and
Law, 1996). The basics of AD are described in Box 1.
Box 1: Adaptive Dynamics
Erol Akçay
Adaptive dynamics achieves tractability on the problem of eco-evolutionary dynamics by
assuming that the ecological dynamics of populations are very fast compared to the rate mu-
tations occur. The typical AD model starts with a monomorphic population (or multiple
monomorphic populations for coevolutionary models) at its ecological equilibrium, introduces
a rare mutant to this population, and calculates its “invasion ﬁtness” (its rate of increase when
rare) at this ecological equilibrium. In the case of epidemiological models, the ecological dy-
namics usually keep track of diﬀerent class of individuals separately (e.g., infected, susceptible,
etc.). If the invasion ﬁtness, denoted by f(xm; xr) where xr is the resident genotype’s trait
value and xm the mutant’s, is higher than the resident’s increase rate, the mutant invades and
takes over the population, and the procedure starts again. Assuming mutants diﬀer very lit-
tle from the residents, one can approximate this process by a simple dynamics that climbs the
gradient of the invasion ﬁtness function, i.e., dxr
dt
/ @f(xm;xr)
@xm
, evaluated at xm = xr. If, for
some trait value xr,
@f(xm;xr)
@xm
= 0, that value is said to be an evolutionarily singular point. If,
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further, @
2f(xm;xr)
@x2m
< 0, the trait value is evolutionarily stable: mutants to either direction of the
singularity will have lower ﬁtness than the resident. Conversely, if @
2f(xm;xr)
@x2m
> 0, the resident
trait value is a ﬁtness minimum and mutants with both higher and lower trait values can invade
the resident population. With suﬃcient mutational variability, the trait value will branch into
two and start diverging (Metz et al., 1996). Finally, whether or not a population will evolve
towards an evolutionarily singular point is determined by the cross derivative @
2f(x;xr)
@xm@xr
< 0,
which means for values below the singular point, mutants with greater than resident trait value
have the advantage and invade, and above the singular point the converse is true. Such singular
points are called convergent stable. A convergent stable singular point is called an evolution-
arily stable strategy (ESS) if it is a ﬁtness maximum, and an evolutionary branching point
(EBP) if it is a ﬁtness minimum. EBPs serve as a model for investigating the conditions under
which selection can lead to diversiﬁcation and adaptive speciation (Doebeli and Dieckmann,
2000), though their relevance to speciation dynamics in nature is debated (Doebeli et al., 2005;
Gavrilets, 2005).
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Yamamura (1993) applies the AD methodology to a model where a symbiont can evolve to
harm or help its host, with harm increasing the symbiont’s own oﬀspring production. The model
conﬁrms that high vertical transmission rates favor helping traits. However, how the transmis-
sion rate evolves depends on who controls it. The symbiont is always selected for higher vertical
transmission rates, because there is no tradeoﬀ between vertical and horizontal transmission in the
model. The host on the other hand is selected to lower the transmission rate when it is low, and
increase it when it is already above a threshold. This model suggests that vertical transmission
can evolve at ﬁrst by a parasite overcoming host defenses and increasing its vertical transmission
rate, becoming less virulent as this happens. When the threshold transmission rate is crossed both
the host and the symbiont will be selected to ensure that vertical transmission happens with high
ﬁdelity, which should lead to maximum mutualistic beneﬁt to be obtained. The concordance of in-
terest between the host and symbiont at the later stage of this process suggests that once a vertically
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transmitted mutualism evolves, it would be very hard to break up. This prediction is in agreement
with recent data on the evolutionary transitions in symbioses that show there are more transitions
from parasitism to mutualism then the other way around (Sachs et al., 2011).
More recent work by Ferdy and Godelle (2005) considers the tradeoﬀ between vertical and hor-
izontal transmission. Such a trade-oﬀ is expected if traits that favor higher horizontal transmission
(infection rates) reduce the ﬁtness of the host and thus vertical transmission rates and is supported
in many empirical studies (e.g., Stewart et al., 2005). Ferdy and Godelle allow the shape of the
trade-oﬀ to be convex (i.e., decreasing marginal fecundity cost of horizontal transmission to the
host) or concave (increasing marginal costs). With convex costs, they ﬁnd evolutionary branch-
ing into divergent strategies of high horizontal transmission-high virulence and low horizontal
transmission-low virulence (or helping) can occur. This is a general phenomenon in AD models,
where the shape of costs and beneﬁts and the ﬁtness components they aﬀect (e.g., fecundity of sur-
vivorship) determine the evolutionary outcome. In particular, evolutionary branching frequently
occurs when costs are decelerating (are convex) or beneﬁts are accelerating (concave) over some
range of traits, as we will also see in the section on evolutionary diversiﬁcation of mutualists in
section 4.5.
4.2 Population structure and genetic associations
One of the most important advances in evolutionary theory after the modern synthesis was the
emergence of theories of selection under population structure, i.e., when individuals do not interact
or disperse in a completely mixed manner. Hamilton (1964) famously showed that if individuals
interact with other individuals that carry similar genotypes, helping others even at a personal cost
to oneself can evolve, provided that the coeﬃcient of relatedness r (appropriately deﬁned) is greater
than the ratio of the personal cost, c to the beneﬁt b supplied, or rb > c. For mutualisms, population
structure operates in two ways: ﬁrst, population structure within a species can promote helping the
other species if the return beneﬁts are likely to go related individuals. Second, population structure
and limited dispersal can create association between mutualist genotypes, which also promotes
cooperation.
There aremany approaches tomodeling evolution in structured populations (and to deriving ver-
sions of the Hamilton’s rule). The most rigorous models explicitly specify the population structure
(most commonly a population structured in discrete demes), population regulation (most commonly
ﬁxed deme size) and the life-cycle of the organisms (most commonly a Wright-Fisher or Moran
process), and write down recursion equations for the probabilities of individuals being identical
by descent (IBD) that can then be solved for determining relatedness. (Lehmann and Rousset,
2010, provides a good overview of this approach). Typically, such models assume that selection
is weak, in which case relatedness can be approximated by the IBD probabilities under neutrality,
and the demographical eﬀects (such as local competition with related individuals) can be separated
from the fertility eﬀects of the traits (see Akçay and Van Cleve, 2012, for an exposition of how
this can be achieved). Practically no model of mutualisms has been built using this approach. In-
stead, models of spatial population structure in mutualism tend to use either a phenomenological
approach (as in Bever and Simms (2000), who use IBD probabilities as an exogenous parameter),
or use individual-based simulations on a lattice (Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al.,
2004). Another powerful approach that has been very inﬂuential in social evolution theory is the
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Price equation, which I discuss here in some detail.
4.2.1 The Price equation
The Price equation (Price, 1970, 1972) expresses the total change in the mean value of a trait in a
population at two time points, say, times t1 and t2 as:
z = cov(w; z) + E(w) : (1)
Here, the ﬁrst term is a covariance between an individual’s trait at t1, z, and its ﬁtness, w, deﬁned
as how many of the individuals at t2 can be assigned to that particular individual at t1. This term is
usually interpreted as giving the eﬀects of selection on the mean trait value. The second term is the
expectation of ﬁtness w and the diﬀerence between the mean trait of the descendants (alive at t2) of
a focal individual and that of the focal individual itself (measured at t1), given by . This second term
gives the eﬀects of other processes, such as transmission bias, phenotypic change, and selection at
diﬀerent levels on the change in mean trait value. The Price equation is an exact identity, meaning
that it holds anytime when one can identify an ancestral and a descendant population, measure traits
of all individuals in them, and assign individuals from the descendant population to individuals at
the ancestral population. In other words, the Price equation allows an elegant summary of the
change in a population, if one already knows every single thing necessary to calculate the change.
Therefore, in its exact form, the Price equation is not actually a model of evolution or a prediction
of the change in the mean trait. Nonetheless, one can sacriﬁce the exactness of the Price equation,
and use its partitioning to organize and interpret the diﬀerent processes inﬂuencing ﬁtness when
we do make models for those processes, such as one based on quantitative genetics (Frank, 1997).
One of the cases the Price equation becomes most fruitful (and the reason I discuss it in this
section) is when individual ﬁtness is a function of the phenotypes of other individuals, and indi-
viduals interact non-randomly with each other. Suppose, for example, a population with pairwise
interactions, in which ﬁtness of a focal individual is given by an additive function of an individual’s
own phenotype and that of a partner, i.e.,
wi = w;zizi + w;zjzj + e ; (2)
where the ’s give the regression coeﬃcients of the ﬁtness on zi and zj , respectively, and e is an error
term independent of either phenotype. The last assumption makes this statistical model of ﬁtness
less general than the exact Price equation, so like many models we have sacriﬁced some generality
in order to gain simplicity. Let us further assume that there is no transmission bias, i.e., the second
term in equation (1) vanishes. Substituting (2) into (1), we obtain:
z = cov(w; z) = cov(w;zizi + w;zjzj + e; zi) = w;zivar(z) + w;zjcov(zj; zi) : (3)
Supposing that the phenotypes correspond directly to the genotypes of the individuals, or zi = gi,
we can replace the phenotypic variance and covariance by the genotypic ones, and divide by the
variance term to obtain:
z
var(g)
= w;zi + w;zjR ; (4)
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where we have deﬁned R = cov(gj; gi)/var(g), or the regression of the partner’s genotype on
the focal individual’s, and is one of the canonical deﬁnitions of relatedness (Frank, 1998). If the
phenotype z is a costly helping behavior, w;zi and w;zj correspond to the cost  c and beneﬁt b,
respectively, so the condition for the increase of such a behavior can be seen to be
Rb  c > 0 ;
which of course is the celebrated Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964). Another useful special case is
when the phenotypes z are continuous, ﬁtness is a smooth function of them, expressed as w(zi; zj),
and the amount of genetic variation around the population mean is small (which would happen
with small eﬀect mutants and low mutation rate). In that case, we can use the following approxi-
mations: w;zi  @w@zi and w;zj  @w@zj (Taylor and Frank, 1996). This is one of the easiest ways to
model phenotypic evolution in structured populations, provided the assumptions are palatable for
the particular system.
In one of the very few applications of the Price equation to mutualisms, Frank (1994) uses
it to derive an extension of Hamilton’s rule, where a cooperative investment of an individual of,
say, Species 1 beneﬁts not only conspeciﬁc neighbors, but also individuals of a mutualist species
(Species 2). In that case, the cooperative investment by Species 1 will be selected for if the following
condition holds:
b1;1R1;1 + b2;1R2;1   c1 > 0 ; (5)
where b1;1 and b2;1 are the beneﬁt from a Species 1 individual’s investment to conspeciﬁcs, and
the beneﬁt from Species 2’s investment to a Species 1 individual, respectively. The coeﬃcients
R1;1 and R2;1 are again deﬁned as regression coeﬃcients between Species 1 individuals’ investment
genotypes and those of their conspeciﬁc or heterospeciﬁc interaction partners, respectively. In-
equality (5) says that cooperation between species can evolve either if the mutualistic investment
has “spillover” beneﬁts to conspeciﬁcs, and relatedness is high enough (the ﬁrst term in (5)), or if the
investment from the partner species is beneﬁcial enough for the focal species, and the cooperative
genotypes from each species are non-randomly associated with each other (the second term in (5)).
Thus, for the evolution of mutualism in structured populations, both within- and between-species
genetic associations are potentially important. Furthermore, mutualistic interactions are inherently
expected to generate between-species genetic associations, as Frank (1994) showed: when more
mutualistic genotypes of both species co-occur in a patch, they will increase in abundance while
populations in less mutualistic patches will decline. Such local build-up of highly mutualist popu-
lations is inherent in the population dynamics of mutualisms, but its eﬀects have not been as widely
studied, apart from a few individual-based simulation studies (e.g. Yamamura et al., 2004).
As in intraspeciﬁc models of social evolution, there is a tension between explicitly quantifying
genetic association as a function of demographic quantities such as dispersal and fertility on one
hand, and being able to derive analytically tractable models focusing on mechanisms that operate
at the individual level. Where one chooses to be along this trade-oﬀ is a matter of what the model
is primarily intended to do. As it stands, there is much work left to be done using either approach.
For example, focusing on the build up of genetic associations in ecological time-scales and their
evolutionary eﬀects in diverse communities would require explicitly modeling the population dy-
namics and demography of partner species. Agent-based simulations can yield important insight
to this question. On the other hand, the integration of genetic association with other mechanisms
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for ﬁtness feedbacks also remains to be fully explored (see section 4.6.1) which can be done with
models that treat population structure implicitly (McGlothlin et al., 2010; Akçay and Van Cleve,
2012; Van Cleve and Akçay, 2014).
4.3 Modeling phenotypic feedbacks
In many mutualisms, the rewards from investing into a partner arise from the partner changing
its investment in return. One classic example (described in more detail in Section 4.4.3, and in
Boxes 5.2 and 6.2) is the legume-rhizobium symbiosis, where high nitrogen ﬁxation by a nodule
increases the resource allocation of the plant to that nodule, and low (or no) ﬁxation elicits reduction
in the plant investment(Kiers et al., 2003; Simms et al., 2006). I use the term phenotypic feedbacks
to denote feedbacks between the investments that happen within the time-scale of the interaction,
reﬂecting the fact that investments in such mutualisms can be thought of as ﬂexible phenotypes
of individuals. Phenotypic feedbacks are distinct from genetic associations and inter-generational
feedbacks due to diﬀerential reproduction of partners. A huge amount of research eﬀort in mu-
tualism theory is focused on modeling phenotypic feedbacks. In this section, I will focus on the
simplest cases, feedbacks in pairwise interactions, or that are otherwise undirected to particular in-
dividuals. Section 4.4 will deal with phenotypic feedbacks directed at particular partners, e.g., as a
function of their performance.
The theory of iterated games (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981)
has historically been a very popular way of modeling phenotypic feedbacks, starting from the ﬁrst
explicitly game theoretic study in biology, Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Phenotypic feedbacks
can be modeled as conditional strategies in iterated games, where behavior in one round depends on
the partner’s behavior in the previous round. This approach had a meteoric rise after the landmark
paper by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), who showed that a very simple conditional strategy that
simply copies the opponent’s previous move can outcompete a multitude of sophisticated strategies.
This set oﬀ an explosion of studies that pitched a multitude of simple conditional strategies against
in each other in various agent-based simulations. While the modeling enterprise soon took on a life
of its own with relatively little connection to biological questions, there have been several studies
that have provided useful insight into biological questions and mutualisms in particular.
In one such study, Doebeli and Knowlton (1998) ask how cooperation between species can
evolve when an individual’s investment in the mutualism is responsive to its partner’s investment.
Doebeli and Knowlton assume pairwise interactions on a lattice structured population. Each pair
plays a constant, ﬁnite number of rounds with each other before reproducing. At each round,
each individual’s investment to the mutualism is determined by the the outcome of the previous
round. More precisely, if a focal individual invests x and its partner y in a given round, the payoﬀ
to the focal individual is given by B(y)   C(x) (beneﬁt from partner’s investment minus the cost
from own investment). The investment of the focal individual in the next round is then given by
a + b(B(y)   C(x)), where a and b are assumed to be genetically encoded strategies (i.e., they
are constant during the time-scale of the interaction). The investments of the partner species are
determined likewise using a linear response rule. The total ﬁtness of an individual is the sum of its
payoﬀs in each round; this total ﬁtness determines the evolution of the investment strategies a and
b.
Using individual-based simulations, Doebeli andKnowlton ﬁnd that in a well-mixed population
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(with global dispersal), the only evolutionarily stable investment strategy is no investment at all
(a = b = 0). On the other hand, if dispersal is localized (so that genetic associations start building
up within and between species), unconditional and conditional investments can evolve even in
ﬁnitely-repeated games. The intuition behind this result is that although a positive response slope
is costly to a focal individual at the end of a ﬁnite interaction (when there is no possibility of positive
feedbacks), population structure allows some of this cost to be “recouped” through eﬀects on kin:
oﬀspring of a focal individual are more likely to interact with other mutualists, as a consequence of
the focal individual’s positive response. Population structure and phenotypic feedback in general
interact synergistically in supporting cooperation (see also section 4.6.1).
One of the key assumptions of Doebeli and Knowlton (1998) is that the interaction lasts for
a ﬁnite number of rounds. This diﬀerentiates their model from a set of related studies for within-
species cooperation (e.g. McNamara et al., 1999; Taylor and Day, 2004) that instead assume that
the number of rounds is very large and therefore concentrate on the equilibrium of the phenotypic
dynamics (i.e., when from one round to the next, the investment levels do not change). Among
these, Taylor andDay (2004) ﬁnd that conditional investment and cooperative investment equilibria
can indeed evolve even in unstructured populations. The intuition behind this result is sometimes
called partner ﬁdelity feedback (Bull and Rice, 1991; Sachs et al., 2004): if one stays with a given
partner long enough and the partner employs a conditional investment strategy, it does not pay to
cheat it for short term beneﬁt.
My coauthors and I (Akçay et al., 2009; Akçay and Van Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and Akçay,
2014) generalized the behavioral equilibrium-based approach and found that the eﬀects of such
feedbacks in continuous, symmetric games can in general be characterized by a local response coef-
ﬁcient , which gives how much a partner of a focal individual increases (or decreases their invest-
ments) in response to a small change in the partner’s investment. For within-species interactions
with population structure, we used the Price equation approach to show that the response coef-
ﬁcient  plays a role symmetric to relatedness r in its eﬀect on selection Akçay and Van Cleve
(2012). Moreover, relatedness and responsiveness interact with each other synergistically in pro-
moting more investment, such that populations with both genetic structure and phenotypic re-
sponses can maintain signiﬁcantly more cooperation than expected by their separate eﬀects. Van
Cleve and Akçay (2014) extend such analysis to a simple model of symbiotic mutualism. They
ﬁnd that the synergistic interaction between phenotypic response coeﬃcients on the one hand and
within- and between-species genetic associations on the other is a general prediction of these mod-
els.
Phenotypic feedbacks can also be modeled using the methodology of quantitative genetics,
which refers to phenotypic feedbacks as indirect genetic eﬀects (IGEs) (Moore et al., 1997; Mc-
Glothlin et al., 2010). The IGE framework starts with a standard quantitative genetics framework
but then incorporates the fact that in a social interaction, an individual’s phenotype (a behavior or
a morphological trait) is a function of not just its own genetic make-up, but those of its partners’ as
well. In the IGE framework, each individual’s phenotype is a linear, additive function of its own
breeding value and the phenotypes of others it interacts with multiplied with some IGE coeﬃcient
(usually denoted by	). In this way, IGEmodels bear a close resemblance to the linear response rule
models, except that IGE coeﬃcient is usually taken to be a constant (with some exceptions, e.g.,
Kazancıoğlu et al., 2012). Akçay and Van Cleve (2012) demonstrate that for a single phenotype,
there is a one-to-one mapping between IGE models in structured populations (McGlothlin et al.,
2010) and the behavioral response formulation, with  and	 invertible functions of each other. The
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advantage of IGE models is that they use the machinery of quantitative genetics, which can handle
multiple traits and their phenotypic and genetic covariances, and provides a robust framework for
empirical measurement of such responses (McGlothlin and Brodie III, 2009). The intersection
of IGE models and models of behavioral and proximate mechanisms mediating the phenotypic
feedbacks is an exciting area of future research (Akçay and Simms, 2011; Akçay and Van Cleve,
2012).
4.4 Partner choice and beyond: the economic theory mutualism
Cooperation between species can also evolve if individuals preferentially interact with a cooperative
subset of partners, or selectively terminate interactions with non-cooperative ones; in other words,
if they exert partner choice. The idea of choice by organisms as a selective force goes back at least to
Darwin’s sexual selection theory, and has also played a central role in social evolution theory (Ax-
elrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bull and Rice, 1991). It also has close parallels with consumer choice
and related economic concepts and thus has been a focus for application of ideas and techniques
from economics to biological problems (Hammerstein and Hagen, 2005). There are many impor-
tant biological questions to ask about partner choice, such as when to choose, what do base partner
choices on, how stringent to partner choice should be, etc. Answering this diverse set of questions
requires a somewhat eclectic set of approaches, which are the focus on these section.
4.4.1 Supply and demand: biological markets
One prominent application of an economic idea to biology has been the concept of biological mar-
kets (Noe and Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). Biological markets theory asserts that just like in hu-
man markets, the supply and demand for partners of high quality will determine the evolutionary
dynamics of a mutualism through partner choice. This idea was ﬁrst modeled by Noe and Ham-
merstein (1994), who consider two species that trade in some “commodities” (e.g., resources such
as nitrogen or carbon, or services such as pollination). One of the species (say, species B) can invest
at into producing commodities of high or low value to the other species, low-value commodities
being less costly to produce. Furthermore, there is some noise in production of commodities by
species B, such that a high-investment might produce a low value, and vice-versa. This last feature
ensures that there is phenotypic variability in the population that makes partner choice worthwhile,
even if the population is ﬁxed for one investment type. Species A, on the other hand, has a ﬁxed
amount of investment, but it has the ability to choose its partner from the B species, but that
comes at a cost, in terms of the eﬀort spent sampling diﬀerent partners. The model has two diﬀer-
ent kinds equilibria depending on the relative abundance of the species: if species A is abundant,
A individuals will accept low-value partners, and B species invest into low-value commodities. On
the other hand, if B individuals are abundant, A individuals only trade with high-value partners
and consequently the B population is ﬁxed for high investment. These results make sense from a
supply-demand perspective: when A individuals are relatively rare, B individuals are willing to pay
the cost of high-investment to be chosen by a partner. Interestingly, there is a range of relative
abundances where both equilibria exist at the same time, meaning that two diﬀerent populations
with the same abundances can inhabit either regime, depending on the initial conditions.
Applying the consumer-choice metaphor at the individual decision-making level, Kummel and
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Salant (2006) model a plant that can associate with multiple mycorrhizal partners. Each partner
is characterized by an exchange function, which denotes how much nutrient it supplies for a given
amount of carbon it receives. The plant then has to decide how much nutrient it “buys” from
each “supplier”. Kummel and Salant show that the optimal allocation of carbon will equalize the
marginal cost of nutrient acquisition from each partner. Interestingly, the exchange function char-
acterization admits a much richer space of variation in partner quality than a dichotomy between
mutualists vs. cheaters: a partner can be very beneﬁcial at low exchange rates (exchange function
goes up steeply at ﬁrst) but not at higher exchange rates (exchange function levels oﬀ ), and vice
versa. Kummel and Salant show that depending on set of exchange functions available to the plant,
complex patterns of partner choice can emerge. An extension of this model that incorporates myc-
orrhizal ﬁtness shows that it can also generate context dependency the beneﬁts to the mycorrhizae
(Akçay, unpublished results).
Yet another approach based on the idea of markets was proposed by Schwartz and Hoeksema
(1998; Hoeksema and Schwartz 2003), who ask when trade between two species is beneﬁcial to
begin with. In their model, both species need two distinct resources (say, carbon and phosphorus).
The two species can either take both resources up from the environment or they can each take up
only one and trade with each other for the other. This situation is directly analogous to comparative
advantagemodels from international trade going back to Adam Smith andDavid Ricardo (Ricardo,
1891), The basic idea is that countries might do best if they focus on producing goods for which
they have a comparative advantage (e.g., Portuguese wine is better than British), and rely on trade
to obtain other goods that they need. Schwartz and Hoeksema (1998) show that under some
“exchange rates” of the two resources, it is optimal for each species to specialize in taking up only
one resource and trade with each other for the other. The existence of such exchange rates depends
on the ratio at which each species optimally consumes the two resources (i.e., the stoichiometry of
their growth), and their relative eﬃciency in obtaining each resource directly from the environment.
Specialization with trade is optimal when the two species are relatively more eﬃcient in taking up
diﬀerent resources from the environment.
4.4.2 The paradox of the market
Themechanisms of partner choice and biological markets as means to select against cheaters create
something of a paradox: if partner choice is eﬀective, cooperative partners will increase in frequency,
leading most individuals to interact only with cooperative partners, leading to lower beneﬁts from
choice. Eventually, the cost of partner choice will create selection against it, which opens the door
for cheaters to invade again. This dynamic is well-known in the study of sexual selection as the
“paradox of the lek” (Kirkpatrick and Ryan, 1991), and has attracted a persistent research eﬀort
over more than 30 years. Foster and Kokko (2006) tackle this issue with a model in which a host
interacts with symbionts that are drawn from a distribution of mutualistic quality, but chooses the
more beneﬁcial ones. This choice depletes available variation in mutualist quality locally, but Foster
and Kokko propose that it is continually replenished by migration from a source population in
which variation is held constant. With enough such migration, costly partner choice and a high
level of average cooperation can be maintained. In a fundamental sense, though, this model begs
the question, since it assumes some unspeciﬁed mechanism that maintains the variation in the
source population. As Foster and Kokko point out, the beneﬁt from choice in mutualisms does
not require additive genetic variation in the partner quality (as it does in the paradox of the lek),
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so purely environmental or non-additive genetic variation (both of which are easy to maintain even
under selection) can make partner choice beneﬁcial in the absence of additive genetic variation in
partner quality. This is important, because empirical evidence suggests thatmost variation in partner
quality is not additive (with unconditionally beneﬁcial and non-beneﬁcial partners); rather, the costs
and beneﬁts are highly context dependent (see Chapters 7 and 11, as well as section 4.6.2). Such
non-additive variation and mechanisms that generate and maintain variation in mutualist quality
remain relatively unexplored in theory (Heath and Stinchcombe, 2014, see also section 4.5).
4.4.3 Sanctions: partner choice in the legume-rhizobium symbiosis
One of the most important model empirical systems for studying partner choice has been the sym-
biosis between legume plants and the nitrogen-ﬁxing soil bacteria collectively called rhizobia (see
Boxes 5.2 and 6.2). Rhizobia are taken up from the soil and inhabit specialized plant root organs
called nodules. A single plant can have hundreds of nodules, each inhabited by one or more rhi-
zobium strains. Since rhizobia are not vertically transmitted, there is a conﬂict of interest between
the plant and the rhizobia, and hence the prospect of cheating.
Partner choice in the legume-rhizobium system is frequently referred to as “sanctions”, a term
introduced by Denison (2000) who proposed that legume plants control cheating by selectively
withholding resources to nodules that do not ﬁx nitrogen. West et al. (2002b,a) have formalized
Denison’s ideas in two separate models. West et al. (2002b) consider a kin-selection model with
local competition among a population of rhizobia that occupy the same plant, using the approach
of Taylor and Frank (1996, see section 4.2.1). To model partner choice by the plant, West et al.
(2002b) assume that a focal rhizobium strain’s ﬁtness is given by a continuous, increasing function
of the focal strain’s nitrogen ﬁxation rate. They consider two diﬀerent functional forms for this
function: one where it depends only on the focal strain’s ﬁxation rate (which they term ﬁxed-rule
sanctions) and one where it depends both on the focal strain’s ﬁxation rate and the average of all
nodules (termed relative-rule sanctions). Both types of partner choice select for more nitrogen ﬁx-
ation compared to no partner choice. Increasing relatedness between rhizobia on diﬀerent nodules
increases the evolutionarily stable ﬁxation rate under ﬁxed-rule sanctions, but interestingly, it has
the opposite eﬀect under relative-rule sanctions. This is because high relatedness increases the av-
erage nitrogen ﬁxation rate on plants that contain a highly-ﬁxing focal strain, which decreases the
beneﬁt the focal strain obtains from the plant under relative-rule sanctions.
In the companion paper, West et al. (2002a) use the same modeling approach to ask when
it is beneﬁcial for the plant to engage in sanctions when interacting with rhizobium strains that
vary in their nitrogen ﬁxation rate. They model plant ﬁtness as proportional to R  N , where R
stands for the carbon the plant has available for its own growth and reproduction (after investing
into the production of nodules) and N is the total nitrogen the plant obtains from the nodules and
the soil. The amount of resources available for growth, R, is a function of how many nodules a
plant makes initially, how many it sanctions, and what proportion of the resources invested into
sanctioned nodule the plant can reclaim. Likewise, N is a function of how many nodules there
are after sanctions, their average ﬁxation rate, and the availability of nitrogen from the soil. The
crucial assumption in the model is that the average ﬁxation rate of the non-sanctioned nodules is
increasing in the fraction of nodules sanctioned, although the mechanism by which this happens
is not modeled. Under these assumptions, stricter sanctions are favored when more resources are
recouped by sanctioning, higher mean ﬁxation rate among rhizobia before sanctions, and higher
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variance in ﬁxation rates.
The two West et al. models conﬁrm our intuition that sanctions might favor cooperation and
evolve through direct beneﬁts. However, since they treat rhizobia and plants separately, they do
not fully elucidate the patterns of ﬁtness variation that sanctions would generate between plants
and rhizobia. Further, West et al. (2002a) sidestep two important facts: ﬁrst, that the distribution
of rhizobium strains of varying quality on a plant will determine how much beneﬁt the plants gain
by sanctioning, and second, the possibility of mutual control over partner choice. These factors are
treated in the models I discuss next.
4.4.4 Control, negotiation and outside options in mutualisms
In the models in sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3, partner choice is a unilateral aﬀair: one party has
complete control over who it interacts with and how much. When both parties have some control,
richer dynamics ensue. Johnstone and Bshary (2002) consider a model inspired by the cleaner ﬁsh
mutualism, where small cleaner ﬁsh remove ectoparasites from larger ﬁsh that visit their territories,
but prefer to feed on healthy mucus tissue (see Box 7.2 for more on this mutualism). In the model
of Johnstone and Bshary (2002), client-cleaner pairs gain mutual beneﬁts as an increasing function
of time they spend together. The cleaners can however exploit the clients by biting healthy mucus
tissue rather than removing parasites (Bshary and Grutter, 2002), gaining an additional beneﬁt per
unit time at a cost to their clients. The evolutionarily stable exploitation level will be determined
by how the duration of the interaction at diﬀerent exploitation levels, which in turn depends on
which party controls the duration of the interaction. Johnstone and Bshary (2002) assume that
the interaction ends when the marginal cost of continuation to the cleaners exceed the marginal
beneﬁt multiplied by a coeﬃcient signifying the “power” cleaners have over the clients. The more
power cleaners have, the closer the duration will be to their optimum. With increasing power to
the cleaners, evolutionarily stable exploitation levels increase. This shows that the eﬀectiveness of
partner choice depends on whether it can be exercised free from interference from the partners.
In their initial model, Johnstone and Bshary (2002) do not account for the alternatives clients
or cleaners have once they leave an interaction, in other words, their outside options. Johnstone
and Bshary (2008) model outside options arising from population level availability of cleaners and
clients, which is a function of their relative abundances, as well as how long they stay in each
pairwise-interaction. Johnstone and Bshary (2008) use a time-in/time-out approach, where indi-
viduals transition from being free-living (time in the “market”) to being in an interaction (time out),
at a rate that is proportional to the availability of partners. The time out duration is determined as
in Johnstone and Bshary (2002), but with the additional consideration of the opportunity cost of
leaving, which depends on how fast a new partner can be found. This opportunity cost emerges
as a property of equilibrium, with only the overall abundance of clients and cleaners speciﬁed ex-
ogenously. The results support the biological market hypothesis: when clients are rare, low or no
exploitation is expected at equilibrium, but when cleaners are rare, exploitation levels are expected
to be high. In the former case, cleaners face a high opportunity cost of exploiting a client and caus-
ing it to leave, since replacing a partner takes a long time; in the latter case clients are facing the
high opportunity cost. Thus, Johnstone and Bshary (2008) show the importance of outside options
in determining evolutionary outcomes of biological markets.
In interactions where fast partner switching is not an option, as in the legume-rhizobiummutu-
alism, other mechanisms will determine the outcome of the mutualism. The models of West et al.
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(2002a,b) assume that the nitrogen ﬁxation rates are “sealed bids”, determined by the rhizobium
genotype only, while the plant responds to these bids. We (Akçay and Roughgarden, 2007) in-
vestigated an alternative where the ﬁxation rates are the result of a “negotiation” process. The key
idea is that once a nodule is established, there will a range of carbon and nitrogen exchange rates
with a focal nodule that make both the plant and the rhizobia in that nodule better oﬀ (grow more)
relative to no exchange. But some of these exchange rates will favor the plant more, and some the
rhizobia. Where along that continuum the outcome ends up can have important consequences for
how partner choice works at the longer time-scale. In the negotiation between bacteria and plants,
the “oﬀers” come in the form of stochastic ﬂuctuations in resource ﬂuxes. When these ﬂuctuations
increase one party’s growth rate while decreasing the other’s, we conjectured that there would be
a period of costly conﬂict between the parties (modeled as a war of attrition), in which the party
with more to gain (relative to giving in) wins. This simple process converges to the maximum of
the product of the plant’s and nodule’s growth rates. This stable equilibrium point is called the
Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950; Rubinstein, 1982) in economics and provides a basis for
quantitatively predicting the outcome of a negotiation process.
Akçay and Simms (2011) later extended the pairwise negotiation model to negotiation with
two nodules, each providing an outside option to the plant vis-a-vis the other and allowing the
’negotiation strategy’ of the rhizobia to evolve. In particular, we considered rhizobia that have two
evolving traits. The ﬁrst one is what we anthropomorphically termed “stubbornness”, i.e., how
hard it is to get a rhizobium strain to increase its nitrogen ﬁxation or decrease carbon intake. A
more stubborn strain ﬁxes less nitrogen for more carbon, and thus is less cooperative. Second, a
focal nodule could provide a good or bad outside option to the plant, by increasing its nitrogen
ﬁxation temporarily when the plant is negotiating with the other nodule. This outside option trait
is nearly neutral for the focal nodule, since it is only a temporary increase in nitrogen ﬁxation and
does not aﬀect equilibrium ﬁxation rate for the focal nodule directly. When the more stubborn
(less cooperative) nodule has a lower growth rate than the more cooperative nodule, we can say the
plant is exercising eﬀective partner choice (or sanctions). We show that this requires that the less
stubborn strain also provides a better outside option to the plant, and not otherwise. This ﬁnding
provides a potential explanation for why some studies of the legume-rhizobium symbiosis show
eﬀective partner choice (Kiers et al., 2003; Simms et al., 2006; Kiers et al., 2006), but others do not
(Marco et al., 2009; Gubry-Rangin et al., 2010). Strikingly, regardless of whether partner choice
is eﬀective, selection for stubbornness (i.e., against cooperation) is always positive. This is because
the plant has incomplete control over partner choice, and all else being equal, a more stubborn
rhizobium strain will always extract more resources from the plant. To counteract this selection,
a positive feedback at the whole-plant level is required, so that nodules on plants that grow better
do better altogether. This ﬁnding shows that phenotypic feedbacks and selection at multiple levels
might be required to overcome the limitations of partner choice when both parties have control
over the interaction (see Box 5.2).
Grman et al. (2012) recently combined the Nash bargaining approach of Akçay and Roughgar-
den (2007) with the comparative advantage model of Schwartz and Hoeksema (1998) to ask how
a negotiated exchange rate aﬀect the evolution of specialization in a plant-mycorrhizal mutualism.
Mycorrhizal fungi infect the roots of a wide variety of plants, and trade nutrients they acquire from
the soil with the plant for carbon (Smith and Read, 2008). Grman et al. (2012) ﬁnd that specializa-
tion is somewhat less likely with negotiated exchange, since it makes a party completely dependent
on the partner (i.e., reduces the outside options) and means a worse bargaining outcome. Nev-
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ertheless, for empirically derived parameter regimes, specialization (especially of the fungus into
nutrient uptake) does occur at the equilibrium. This study and Johnstone and Bshary (2008) to-
gether demonstrate the utility of combining models that apply at pair- and population-levels (see
Box 2, and section 4.6.1).
The general message from the set of models in this subsection is that the outcome of amutualism
depends strongly on the mechanisms of control each party has over partners and the relative outside
options (e.g., alternative partners, ability to take up resources from the environment, etc.) each party
has. This fact sets the stage for rich evolutionary and ecological dynamics that have not been fully
explored yet.
4.4.5 Screening
An alternative to trying to stop a partner’s exploitation during the interaction is to not associate with
an exploiter in the ﬁrst place. In the cleaner ﬁsh mutualism, for example, clients choose to interact
with only non-exploiting partners, as determined by own experience or observing interactions with
others (Bshary and Grutter, 2002, 2006). As discussed in 4.4.1, such “market choice” can preclude
the evolution of exploitation, but it requires that clients get reliable information in the face of
incentives by the cleaners to misrepresent.
This is a problem that has direct analogies in economics: when a business wants to hire new
employees, it will have imperfect information about the quality of the applicants. Obviously, appli-
cants for the vacancy have an incentive to exaggerate their abilities. One way to resolve this problem
is to make the applicants reliably signal their quality before the interaction, which usually involves
costly signals (Spence 1973; the same idea was proposed independently in biology as the handicap
principle by Zahavi 1975). But an entirely diﬀerent way of separating high and low-quality appli-
cants is to let them sort themselves out. This is termed “screening” in economics (Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1976; Riley, 2001). For example, a ﬁrm can oﬀer a job contract to a candidate that entails
a low salary with a big bonus that is only paid if a certain performance criterion (e.g., sales volume)
is satisﬁed. Candidates that know they cannot satisfy the criterion will have no incentive to accept
the oﬀer, and those that do accept it will automatically have the correct incentives to work hard,
without the need for constant monitoring by their employer. The result mimics eﬀective partner
choice, but there is no explicit signaling of quality, or evaluation of partners by the chooser.
A series of recent papers proposed that screening theory can be applied to understand mutu-
alisms (Archetti et al., 2011; Scheuring and Yu, 2012). Archetti et al. (2011) use the symbiosis
between the Hawaiian bobtail squid (Euprymna scolopes) and Vibrio ﬁscheri bacteria (see Box 6.3) as
an example. The bacteria colonize the light organ of the squid, where they emit light that reduces
detection of the squid by predators. The luciferase enzyme that is responsible for bioluminescence
also happens to remove reactive oxygen species from the interior of the light organ where it can
damage the bacterial cells. Archetti et al. interpret this as a screeningmechanism: only those bacte-
rial strains that can produce light can survive in this hostile environment. Therefore, for would-be
cheaters (strains that don’t produce light), colonizing the squid is a ﬁtness dead-end, and only
light-producing strains will evolve the traits necessary to colonize the squid. This obviates the need
to control cheating after the initial infection, similar to the job oﬀer with bonus example in the
previous paragraph.
The second paper, by Scheuring and Yu (2012), proposes a diﬀerent screeningmechanism, based
on competition between antibiotic producing bacterial strains. Using a model originally developed
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by Mao-Jones et al. (2010) for the establishment of coral diseases, Scheuring and Yu argue that
the host can screen for a beneﬁcial microbiome by letting the antibiotics produced by beneﬁcial
symbionts create the hostile environment for the non-beneﬁcial ones. Following Archetti et al.
(2011), they call this mechanism “competitive screening”. The crucial divergence of this model
from economic screening models is that the symbiont dynamics within a host are bistable: if non-
beneﬁcial microbes initially colonize a host at high frequency, they persist at equilibrium. Thus,
unlike standard screening models, the selection on cheaters for not colonizing the host requires
some pre-infection partner choice mechanism (or vertical transmission) on the part of the host that
results in high initial frequency of beneﬁcial microbes.
4.4.6 Economics and mutualisms: a bright future
This section illustrated how fruitful economic analogies and techniques have been in understanding
partner choice and related phenomena in mutualisms. This is not a coincidence of course: mutu-
alisms are exchanges of resources and services between all organisms, whereas economics studies the
exchange of resources and services among humans. The future of economic theory of mutualisms
seems very bright, with a great deal of work that remains to be done in exploring strategic questions
related to mutualisms using game theory, market modeling, and related theories such as signaling
and screening.
4.5 Evolution and maintenance of diversity in mutualisms
In nature, most mutualisms involve tremendous variation in how beneﬁcial the diﬀerent species
or strains are to their partners. However, relatively few models have speciﬁcally focused on the
emergence and maintenance of diversity (more speciﬁcally, variation in cooperative phenotypes) in
mutualisms.
One of the most sustained theoretical contributions to this question has come from the adaptive
dynamics (AD) approach. As described in Box 5.1, AD can be used to ﬁnd conditions under which
selection will cause a population to branch phenotypically, evolving in two diﬀerent directions.
Doebeli and Dieckmann (2000) analyze an instance of such evolutionarily branching in mutualisms
as part of a larger compendium of models for adaptive speciation. They consider standard Lotka-
Volterra dynamics of two mutualists, but let the interaction coeﬃcients between the species evolve,
with more beneﬁts from the interaction if the trait values (e.g., ﬂowering time for a ﬂower and
emergence time for its insect pollinator) match, with the trade-oﬀ that each species also has an
independent (e.g., abiotic) optimum value for the trait. Doebeli and Dieckmann ﬁnd that if these
trait optima are far enough apart evolutionary branching might occur, resulting in two species pairs
that match each other well.
One potential objection to Doebeli and Dieckmann’s approach is that in their model, the cost
of mutualism is due to deviation from some external optimum, rather than costly investments that
are beneﬁcial to the partner. This issue is addressed by Ferrière et al. (2002) who consider the evo-
lution of costly provisioning of some resource by partners in an obligate mutualism. Their model
incorporates intraspeciﬁc competition in each species for both the resources provided by the partner
species as well as for some other, mutualism-independent resource. The ecological dynamics of the
two populations are stable when rates of resource provision is positive but not too high. Cheat-
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ing can destabilize mutualism evolutionarily (and lead populations to extinction) when individuals
compete equally well for partner-provided resources regardless of their own provision. A compet-
itive advantage for better mutualists –not surprisingly– counteracts cheating, but there is also the
potential for evolutionary branching in the provision rate when the competitive advantage of mu-
tualists is accelerating faster than the cost of providing commodities. Biologically, this means that
mechanisms such as partner choice that create steep diﬀerences between the ﬁtness of good and
bad mutualist partners are more likely to create diversity in mutualistic quality.
Ferrière et al. (2007) extend this model to include a third, unrelated species that only exploits
its partner, without providing any beneﬁts. They ﬁnd that if an exploiter invades a system after
high levels of cooperation have evolved, it can take over and cause the collapse of the mutualism.
In contrast, if the exploiter invades the system early, the provision rates evolve to lower stable val-
ues, but are also immune to further invasion by exploiters, similar to what was found by Golubski
and Klausmeier (2010) in an “ultimatum game” model. In the same three-species setting, Jones
et al. (2009) further ﬁnd that the intensity of intraspeciﬁc competition among the mutualists and
exploiters mediates their coexistence, with high intraspeciﬁc competition in both promoting coex-
istence, and low competition in one tending to drive the other to extinction.
Borrowing an approach from ecological coexistence theory, Hoeksema and Kummel (2003) use
a patch occupancy model to explore how cooperative genotypes (in their case, of mycorrhizae) can
coexist with non-cooperative genotypes. In contrast to the AD models, they assume the coopera-
tive genotypes are actually competitively inferior to the non-cooperative types, due to their costly
resource provisioning. Nonetheless, both can survive if cooperative mycorrhizae is better able to
colonize empty root tips as they appear. This is one of the few models that has investigated the
trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent traits aﬀecting mutualist performance, which is likely to be of impor-
tance in maintaining mutualism variation.
4.6 Future directions
4.6.1 Integrating mechanisms and modeling approaches
Themainmessage of this chapter is that there aremany diﬀerentmechanisms and selective pathways
can resolve conﬂicts in mutualisms. Existing models tend to consider each selective pathway in
isolation, but it is likely that multiple mechanisms frequently operate at the same time, and at
diﬀerent levels. For example, the model of (Akçay and Simms, 2011) for the legume-rhizobium
mutualism suggest that the interaction of feedbacks at the nodule and whole plant level determines
whether there will be selection for cooperation or not. Box 5.2 by Simms and Porter discuss in more
detail the multiple levels of selection in a hierarchically organized symbiosis. Using the legume-
rhizobiummutualism as an example, they argue that phenotypic feedbacks and population structure
at diﬀerent scales generate diﬀerent selection pressures at multiple levels of selection. The net
outcome of selection on symbiosis traits is determined by the interaction of these feedbacks and
levels. So far, there has been relatively little theoretical work that tries to integrate feedbacks and
selection pressures at multiple levels.
In one of the only attempts to integrate multiple mechanisms, Foster and Wenseleers (2006)
consider a model where the ﬁtness of a mutualist of species A depends on the mutualist’s own
investment, a “passive” phenotypic feedback (akin to by-products) from the partner in response to
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investment, active partner choice, and the help received from the partner. They then decompose the
latter three feedbacks as a product of a total potential beneﬁt, the realized fraction of the potential
(due to the degree of ﬁdelity between the partners), and the relatedness of species A individuals
that beneﬁt from each feedback, and write the ﬁrst-order condition for increased investment (i.e.,
the total derivative of ﬁtness with respect to A’s investment) in this expanded form. Interpreting
this equation, Foster and Wenseleers argue that passive feedbacks and active partner choice should
play a more important role in promoting mutualisms than genetic associations between species.
Importantly, Foster andWenseleers make explicit that diﬀerent processes might operate at diﬀerent
scales, and therefore be subject to diﬀerent population structures, summarized by their separate
relatedness coeﬃcients. On the other hand, the way theymodel phenotypic feedbacks precludes any
interaction between these processes; in particular, each species’ investment phenotype is assumed to
be independent from these feedbacks. This would be inconsistent with what most people regard as
active or passive phenotypic feedbacks, in which, say, a positive feedback to a good mutualist would
most likely be higher mutualistic investment into that partner (e.g. Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998).
When feedbacks occur over investments, a variety of models ﬁnd that the genetic associations and
phenotypic feedback coeﬃcients interact bothmultiplicatively and additively (Lehmann and Keller,
2006; McGlothlin et al., 2010; Akçay and Van Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and Akçay, 2014, section
4.3), and Foster and Wenseleer’s conclusions will likely change.
Box 2: Phenotypic feedbacks and multilevel selection in mutualisms
Ellen Simms and Stephanie Porter
Costly cooperative investments trade oﬀ with individual ﬁtness and directly select for
cheating (earlier in chapter; Fig 1A), but positive host responses to symbiont cooperation can
counter selection for cheating (Fig 1B; sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6.3). These phenotypic feed-
backs can align partners’ ﬁtness (Sachs et al., 2004) and produce positive net ﬁtness covariance
between partners (Fig 1C), despite the potential beneﬁts of cheating.
WSd 
ZS 
WSi 
ZS 
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WH 
A B C
Figure 1: Direct symbiont ﬁtness cost,W dS , as a function of resources allocated to cooperation
phenotype, zs (A). Indirect symbiont ﬁtness beneﬁtW iS , as a function of symbiont cooperation
phenotype, resulting from feedback from the host (B). Net ﬁtness alignment of host,WH , and
symbiont ﬁtnessWS in stable mutualism (C).
Many mutualisms exhibit hierarchical spatial organization delimited by modules. Exam-
ples include ﬂowers in the yucca-moth interaction, inﬂorescences in the wasp-ﬁg interaction
and nodules in the legume-rhizobium interaction. Hierarchical spatial organization of sym-
bionts creates the potential for multi-level selection (Okasha, 2006). Therefore, exclusively
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measuring selection and feedbacks at only one level - among modules, for example - would be
inadequate for predicting the evolution of cooperation if multiple symbiont genotypes occur
within a module or feedbacks and selection can occur at levels above and/or below the module
(e.g., see discussion of Akçay and Simms, 2011, in section 4.4.4).
The legume-rhizobiummutualism oﬀers an especially interesting case for examiningmulti-
level selection on symbionts. Soil-dwelling rhizobium bacteria infect legume roots, stimu-
late nodule formation, proliferate, and may diﬀerentiate to ﬁx nitrogen in exchange for plant-
derived photosynthates (Oldroyd et al., 2011). Nodules can contain one or more rhizobium
genotypes (Friesen and Mathias, 2010). Reproductive rhizobium cells return to soil popula-
tions upon nodule senescence and symbiosis is re-initiated with each new nodule. Thus, the
scales of selection relevant to the maintenance of cooperative rhizobia are: 1) among free-living
rhizobium cells, 2) among rhizobium genotypes within a mixed nodule, 3) among nodules, and
4) among plants (Fig 2). Further, phenotypic feedbacks by hosts can modulate selection within
each host generation.
4) Among plants 
1) Among 
free-living 
cells 
2) Among 
strains within a 
mixed nodule 3) Among nodules 
Figure 2: Levels of selection and phenotypic feedbacks relevant to the maintenance of cooper-
ative rhizobia. Dark circles, cooperative rhizobia; light circles, uncooperative rhizobia.
Selection on cooperation in the legume-rhizobium symbiosis may diﬀer in sign and mag-
nitude among levels. Less cooperative rhizobia might better survive in soil or compete for
nodulation sites (Denison and Kiers, 2011; Oldroyd et al., 2011), leading to selection against
rhizobium cooperation, but phenotypic feedback via host choice prior to nodule formation can
favor more cooperative rhizobium cells (Heath and Tiﬃn, 2009). After infection, sanctions
(Kiers et al., 2003) or partner ﬁdelity feedback (Bull and Rice, 1991; Sachs et al., 2004) can
favor nodules with rhizobium subpopulations that express greater cooperation, leading to pos-
itive selection at the nodule level. If less-cooperative rhizobia could manipulate host responses
or free-ride within mixed nodules then direct selection would favor less cooperative rhizobia
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within nodule subpopulations (Friesen and Mathias, 2010). However, rhizobium cheating
might reduce host ﬁtness and thereby favor cooperation via selection at the level of the entire
host. Phenotypic feedback by hosts could also create cell-level selection by favoring more-
cooperative rhizobium cells within a nodule. Thus, understanding the maintenance of coop-
eration in this symbiosis requires accounting for the levels, signs, and relative magnitudes of
selection in the soil, in nodules, and among plants.
This accounting will be complicated by environmental variation that could dynamically
shift the relative magnitudes of selection and host responses across scales. Increasing soil rhizo-
bium density increases the number of mixed infection nodules on a host (Friesen and Mathias,
2010; Sachs et al., 2010), which would increase within-nodule selection for cheating if unco-
operative rhizobia were more ﬁt than cooperative genotypes within mixed infection nodules.
Host ontogeny aﬀects the magnitude of selection at the level of the whole host. Seedlings host
few nodules and if early viability selection on seedlings dominates selection among plants, then
plant-level selection for rhizobium cooperation could be strong. However, the number of nod-
ules, and thus the potential diversity of symbionts sharing a host, increases as plants mature,
which reduces whole-plant level selection.
The availability of traded resources could also impact selection (Heath and Tiﬃn, 2009;
Akçay and Simms, 2011). For example, shading and high external nitrogen both increase
carbon limitation, leading plants to drive a harder bargain with rhizobia and thus favor “more-
stubborn” rhizobia that are poorer nitrogen ﬁxers. However, if shading resulted from inter-
plant competition, it could strengthen viability selection among plants, thereby increasing
whole-plant level selection in favor of rhizobial cooperation. High soil nitrate availability re-
duces nodulation rates via autoregulation of nodulation, which could also increase selection for
cooperation if it strengthened pre-infection partner choice. While we have highlighted levels
of selection that we expect to be sensitive to external contexts, further development of this hy-
pothesis requires more explicit theoretical models to clarify the implications of such selection,
as well as empirical measurements of selection on symbionts at multiple scales in contrasting
environmental conditions. This research will improve predictions about the evolution of coop-
eration within realistically rich patterns of environmental heterogeneity.
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4.6.2 Context dependency
One of the major lessons from the past couple of decades in mutualism research is that the beneﬁts
from most mutualisms (or even whether the interaction is mutualistic or not) depend on both the
biotic and abiotic context (see Chapter 11). Increasingly it appears that most variation we see in the
costs and beneﬁts of mutualisms in nature are due to these context-dependent eﬀects. Identifying
cheaters unequivocally in nature has been challenging (see Chapter 7). One important source of
context dependency is the evolved phenotypic feedbacks (partner ﬁdelity or partner choice) that
stabilize mutualisms. For example, in the relative sanctions model of West et al. (2002b), rhizo-
bium ﬁtness depends on the other strains connecting the same plant, because the plant’s partner
choice is relative to the mean nitrogen ﬁxation rate. Models that explicitly focus on the causes and
consequences of context dependency either due to environment (Pringle et al., 2013), life-history
variation (Palmer et al., 2010), or phenotypic responses (Akçay and Simms, 2011) will be useful in
understanding the variation in the costs and beneﬁts of mutualisms in the environment. Coupling
these models with the ecological and resource dynamics of the mutualisms (e.g., soil nitrogen and
plant interspeciﬁc competition in the legume-rhizobium case) will also help predict the responses
of mutualistic interactions to global change (Kiers et al., 2010).
4.6.3 Alignment of evolutionary interests
With the focus on the cheater problem in the literature (see Sachs, Chapter 7), it is easy to conclude
mutualisms as a constant battleground. However, empirical research shows broad alignment of
interest between parties in most, if not all, mutualisms (e.g. Friesen, 2012, see also Chapter 7).
Yet, most theory is based on the assumption that mutualisms must have an underlying conﬂict of
interests. This assumption is certainly supported by what we know about “ﬁrst principles” in many
mutualisms, for example, the fact nitrogen ﬁxation is energetically costly for rhizobia. At face value,
we seem to have a mismatch between theory and empirical ﬁndings. But a more nuanced reading of
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the theory suggests a diﬀerent interpretation. All of the mechanisms discussed in this chapter that
increase mutualistic genotypes’ ﬁtness relative to cheaters as implicitly aligning the evolutionary
interests of the parties. In this view, mutualisms are rife with potential for conﬂicts of interests, but
these are resolved through one or more mechanisms. Equivalently, one might say that mutualisms
evolve only when the underlying conﬂicts of interests are suﬃciently resolved.
Alignment of interests therefore provides a complementary perspective to the cheating prob-
lem. However, theoretical literature only recently started to focus explicitly on resolving conﬂicts
of interests. Along these lines, Worden and Levin (2007) consider a population that starts out
playing a prisoner’s dilemma game, but is subject to mutations that change the payoﬀ matrix of the
game. They show that eventually, the population evolves to play a game of perfectly aligned inter-
ests. The evolution towards mutual interest is unconstrained because Worden and Levin assume
no cost to helping (or not hurting) one’s partner. Later, we (Akçay and Simms, 2011) analyzed a
related model where the mutation that gives an incentive to the partner to cooperate is costly to
the focal individual. We showed that despite costs, such incentives can invade a population if they
are suﬃciently big to induce the partner to put up with cheating. Interestingly, under a diploid
population genetic model, a stable polymorphism arises between the diﬀerent alleles that modify
the game. The result is a rich diversity of game structures that coexist in a population. Behaviorally,
even though defecting individuals on average have higher ﬁtness than cooperators, the system is
nonetheless stable, because the genetic polymorphism is not in the behavior itself, but the games
individuals play. These models have not yet been extended to interactions between species, which
represents a fruitful avenue for future research. It will also be important to develop a formal frame-
work to measure and quantify the alignment of ﬁtness interests. Quantitative genetic theory is
likely to provide an good basis for such a theory.
Alignment of interests is a harder problem to solve when there is asymmetric or private in-
formation (i.e., one party can condition its behavior on some information while the other party
cannot), as in the signaling or screening models discussed in section 4.4.5. The theory of mecha-
nism design in economics (Myerson, 1979; Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Akçay et al., 2012)
deals with these situations and concerns itself with ﬁnding games that achieve the best outcome
(deﬁned according to some performance measure) given private information and conﬂicts of in-
terests. In general, it is not always possible to achieve full eﬃciency (i.e., taking advantage of all
the opportunities for mutual beneﬁt) when parties are privately informed (Myerson and Satterth-
waite, 1983; Akçay et al., 2012). However, mechanism design provides techniques to compute
game structures that achieve a second-best outcome given the constraints of private information.
If one makes the working assumption that natural selection modiﬁes games to achieve the most
mutual beneﬁt that is compatible with individual-level selection, these second-best mechanisms
provide testable hypotheses about what we might expect to see in nature. More importantly, an
evolutionary version of mechanism design theory can open the door to a deeper understanding of
how natural selection structures biological organization for mutual beneﬁt in both mutualisms and
within-species cooperation (Akçay et al., 2010).
4.6.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a survey of the main ideas that have been inﬂuential in mutualism research.
It is of course impossible to be all-inclusive (the existing literature is already too big for that), but
I have tried to highlight the principle ideas in evolutionary theory of mutualisms and the mod-
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eling approaches used to address them. We are beginning to see a new generation of theoretical
approaches to social evolution and mutualisms, and these hold the promise of both uncovering new
theoretical principles but also bringing models closer to data. When this book is updated in a few
decades we will surely to see the fruits of that eﬀort.
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